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A culture of denial over the horizontal spread of genetically modified nucleic acids prevails in the face of
direct evidence that it has occurred widely when appropriate methods and molecular probes are used for
detection.
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T
he first genetically modified (GM) crop was com-
mercially approved and released into the environ-
ment 20 years ago. From the beginning, some of
us have been warning repeatedly of hidden dangers from
the unintended horizontal transfer of GM DNA (trans-
genes). A comprehensive review (1) and successive updates
were submitted to the World Health Organization (WHO)
and regulatory agencies in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the European Union (2), all to no avail.
The position taken by regulators and their scientific
advisors today is perhaps best represented in a recent
publication (3) with you Kaare Nielson at Norwegian
University of Science and Technology as lead author.
As you serve as both an advisor to Genøk-Centre for
Biosafety and member of the European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA) and the Norwegian Scientific Com-
mittee for Food Safety (SCFS) GMO panels, I feel it is
important to address my remarks to you.
The paper, entitled ‘Detecting rare gene transfer events
in bacterial populations’ recognizes that horizontal gene
transfer is part of the risk assessment for GMOs, and that
the large-scale cultivation of GM-plants on more than
170mhaworldwideresultsin‘multitudinousopportunities
for bacterial exposure to recombinant DNA and therefore
opportunities for unintended horizontal dissemination
of transgenes’. It admits that horizontal gene transfer has
indeedbeendemonstratedinthelaboratory.‘Butinnatural
settings, negative or inconclusive evidence has been re-
ported from most sampling-based studies of agricultural
soils, runoff water and gastrointestinal tract contents’.
It tells us that horizontal gene transfer research ‘suffers
from significant methodological limitations, model un-
certainty and knowledge gaps’. In particular, on account
of the ‘low mechanistic probability of horizontal transfer
...in complex environments’, it would take ‘months, years,
or even longer for the few initially transformed cells to
divide and numerically out-compete non-transformed
members of the population’ for them to be ‘detectable’.
The rest of the paper mentions a mathematical model
based on those assumptions, the most important being
the very low probability of horizontal transfer, which has
been contradicted by empirical evidence, most decisively
from a study in China reported in 2012 (4).
I have recently reviewed the positive and circumstantial
evidence for horizontal transfer of GM nucleic acids
thoroughly (2). The present report updates on important
new developments.
Even short and damaged DNA is readily
transferred, but GM DNA is still ignored
You are also a lead investigator of a new study (5) show-
ing that even short and damaged DNA, ubiquitous in
most environments, is readily taken up by many bacteria
and incorporated into the bacterial genome. The results
not only contradict your earlier claim that horizontal
transfer of transgene DNA has a ‘low mechanistic pro-
bability’ but also previous work claiming that only much
longer sequences are effectively transferred. The new
study shows that damaged and degraded sequences as
short as 20 bp could be taken up and incorporated into
the bacterial genome, including DNA from a 43,000-
year-old woolly mammoth bone. The significance of the
research is highlighted (5): ‘Our findings suggest that
natural genetic exchange of DNA from dead and even
extinct organisms to contemporary bacteria can take
place over hundreds to thousands of years. Hence, damaged
and degraded DNA may be a previous unrecognized

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tionary theory’ (p. 1).
However, no mention is made of the huge amounts of
transgenic DNA released into the environment from GM
crops and industrial ‘contained’ uses of GMOs, which
most certainly could be taken up and incorporated into
bacterial genomes by similar mechanisms.
The authors remark that natural transformation with
short DNA fragments are likely to involve base substitu-
tions that result in modification or loss of gene function
rather than acquisition and integration of entire genes
that happens in transformation with long DNA fragments.
(They fail to state that promoter/enhancer sequence of
genes and sequences encoding the plethora of newly dis-
covered regulatory RNAs (6) can be very short indeed,
and when taken up and incorporated into the bacterial
genomes, can have sweeping effects on gene expression
and biological functions, including those involved in
causing diseases to plants, animals, and humans.)
More importantly, as the authors write, short DNA
molecules do not encounter the same barriers to natural
transformation as longer DNA fragments such as con-
flicting gene order, function, and DNA similarity. Although
requirements for DNA similarity are still present, short
similar DNA stretches are more likely to be found in a
broader range of species, and the probability of random
sequence similarity increases as fragment size decreases.
The transformation frequencies of short DNA se-
quences are relatively low compared with long sequences,
but, as the paper stresses, short DNA sequences are much
more plentiful in the environment than long sequences,
because the majority of DNA sequences will be in various
states of degradation.
The authors highlight the fact that two adjacent
nucleotide changes  which they find to be more likely
than single nucleotide changes  can result in markedly
increased antibiotic resistance, and ‘[b]iological waste
disposal and decontamination practices, e.g., in hospitals
where antibiotic-resistant infections are common, are
focused on controlling organisms rather than free DNA
molecules, and usually results in only partial DNA frag-
mentation’. In that context, they could have included
laboratories and contained facilities creating and grow-
ing GM microorganisms from which large amounts of
nucleic acids are routinely discharged into the environ-
ment as ‘tolerated releases’ (7).
The report constantly alludes to ‘natural transforma-
tion’ to emphasize the increasingly accepted notion that
horizontal gene transfer is part of the amazing feats of
‘natural genetic engineering’ (8) or ‘natural genetic modi-
fication’ (9) that organisms and cells carry out in order
to survive (10). However, there is nothing ‘natural’ about
GM nucleic acids, which contain numerous synthetic
parts and novel combinations, and are designed to over-
come and override natural genetic modification pro-
cesses. Nevertheless, GM nucleic acids can exploit natural
transformation processes to wreak potential havoc on
health and the environment (2, 9). There is already evi-
dence that short, degraded DNA is readily taken up by
human cells and integrated into the genome, that nucleic
acids are actively secreted by cells into the circulatory
system, and nucleic acids in food can enter the blood
stream and influence gene expression in cells of the body
[see (10)].
You and your colleagues (3, 5), while not denying that
horizontal transfer of GM nucleic acids can take place,
are giving the wrong impression that it has a very low
probability, hence lulling the public into a false sense of
security, and giving license to continued release of GMOs
into the environment. Sadly, you have been basing your
arguments on obsolete assumptions concerning the trans-
formability of bacteria and the probability of horizontal
gene transfer, as well as outdated technologies for detect-
ing horizontal gene transfer which were highly insensitive
(3). You have been ignoring new findings, including your
own, and the fact that the technologies have advanced by
leaps and bounds in recent years. It is now possible to
detect horizontal gene transfer directly without culturing
the bacteria [see (2)]; this is important as the over-
whelming majority of bacteria in the environment cannot
be cultured in the laboratory, and consequently, direct
detection is revealing much higher frequencies of hor-
izontal gene transfer. In addition, PCRs (polymerase
chain reactions) for detecting specific sequences and
nucleic acid sequencing methods have improved to such
an extent that they can even be done on single cells (11).
Finally to detect GM DNA, it is necessary to use the
appropriate molecular probes (primers) and analysis
based on the relevant bioinformatics databases. Using
such methods, scientists in China have indeed detected
specifically the antibiotic resistance marker gene in
commercial plasmids that is turning up in all of China’s
rivers (4) (see text below), even though the country has
not been commercially growing GMOs to any great
extent.
Non-transformable species are readily
transformable
The assumption that only some bacteria are naturally
transformable is questionable, another indication that
horizontal gene transfer via uptake of nucleic acids is
much more widespread. Researchers led by Dongchang
Sun at Zhejian Academy of Agricultural Sciences Hon-
gzhou, China, have discovered that ‘non-transformable’
species of bacteria such as the common laboratory bac-
terium Escherichia coli is readily transformable by plas-
mids (12). Gene transfer through plasmid is one of
the major routes for spreading antibiotic resistance in
bacteria. Outbreaks of life-threatening superbugs such as
New Delhi metallo-b-lactamase-1 (NDM-1) bacteria and
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the transfer of antibiotic resistance genes in plasmids. Al-
though plasmid transfer by conjugation (a bacterial mating
process) was discovered in E. coli long ago, the species was
traditionally considered not naturally transformable and
needs special treatments such as electric shock or Ca
2
stimulation and heat shock. Yet, a complete set of compe-
tence gene homologs for DNA-uptake machinery is found in
t h eg e n o m eo fE. coli. Moreover, transcription of some
competence genes is inducible by a competence regulator
homologSxy.Theteamhaspreviouslyshown,asothershave,
that E. coli is able to acquire naked plasmid DNA on agar
plates at 378C without any special treatment. Spontaneous
plasmid transformation of E. coli is independent of the
DNA-uptake machinery for single-stranded DNA entry.
Instead DNA is taken up rapidly within 2 minutes of
exposure, and most of the transforming DNA will have
entered E. coli cells within 10 minutes.
Synthetic plasmid antibiotic resistance gene
found in all of China’s rivers
At the end of 2012, Li Jun Wen, Jin Min, and colleagues
at Sichuan University in China reported finding geneti-
cally engineered plasmids containing an antibiotic resis-
tance gene in all six of China’s rivers (4). We have reported
extensively on it (13), including a list of GM crops already
commercialized, field tested, or imported that contain the
particular ampicillin-resistant gene bla ´.
What is so significant about the work is that the re-
searchers set out specifically to investigate if the geneti-
cally engineered antibiotic resistance gene is present in
the environment, using the appropriate molecular probes
and tools that are readily available. And it is the first
ever such study in the world. Consequently, claims such
as that made by you and your colleagues (3) and other
regulatory agencies and promoters of GMOs that hor-
izontal transfer of transgenes does not take place, or only
very rarely takes place in nature is fully contradicted. You
simply have not been looking for it; it is a case of ‘don’t
look, don’t find’.
The Sichuan University research team wrote (4):
‘While antibiotic-selectable synthetic plasmid vectors
have proved invaluable tools of genetic engineering, this
class of artificial recombinant DNA sequences with high
expression of antibiotic resistance genes presents an un-
known risk beyond the laboratory setting’ (p. 13448).
Using PCR and real-time quantitative PCR with a
combination of primers designed to detect the synthetic
plasmids containing the antibiotic resistance gene, they
detected various levels of bla ´ in all six rivers sampled,
ranging from the lowest, Yellow River with about 70
copies of the bla ´ gene/ml of water sampled, to the highest
in the Pearl River and Haihe River at 1,200 and 1,300
copies/ml, respectively (read by eye from Fig. 1 in the
paper).
The environmental plasmids in the river samples
were used to transform E. coli cells to create a ‘plasmid
metagenome’ library of 205 ampicillin-resistant strains.
Of these, 27.3% were positive for bla ´ on PCR analysis.
Sequencing confirmed the synthetic plasmid vector
sources. In addition, tests for antibiotic resistance con-
firmed the ampicillin-resistant functions of the environ-
ment plasmids. The resistance spectrum of transformants
from the Pearl and Haihe rivers, in particular, had
expanded to the third and fourth-generation of cepha-
losporin drugs, while that of other transformants mainly
involved first and second generation cephalosporins.
The researchers explained why they focused on the
synthetic plasmid antibiotic resistance marker: ‘Plasmids
have been exploited as experimental tools to facilitate rapid
and efficient genetic engineering. To improve transform-
ing efficiency and clone yields, synthetic plasmid vectors
were developed with series of selectable genetic markers,
among which antibiotic resistance sequences proved
especially useful. Further manipulation to achieve hyper-
transmissibility allowed these synthetic plasmids carrying
multiple drug resistance genes, to be readily horizontally
spread in the laboratory setting’ (pp. 134489).
‘Over the past decade, genetic engineering technology
has expanded beyond scientific research into practical
industries including biofuel fermentation, agriculture,
and environment bioremediation. Consequently, the syn-
thetic plasmid vectors used in industrial applications
have a greater chance of uncontrolled discharge into the
environment, where they may pose a risk of transferring
their antibiotic resistance genes to natural microbes’.
The bla ´ recombinant gene was derived from wild-
type b-lactam hydrolase genes, which confer robust drug
resistance to pathogens and include the extended spec-
trum b-lactamases (ESBL) and NDM-1, but which also
have high mutations rates.
Three pairs of universal primers were designed for
detecting the bla ´ gene and two pairs of primers for pUC
and PBR322 synthetic vectors, respectively, covering inser-
tion sites for sequence detection of the foreign DNA
including the recombinant bla ´ gene.
The PCR products of six river samples and six
transformants in the plasmid metagenomic library were
selected for sequence alignment and phylogenetic analy-
sis. Alignment hits most frequently represented artificial
or synthetic constructs, including cloning expression,
shuttle, gene fusion, and gene trap vectors. In addition,
screening results for vectors (VecScreen) demonstrated
that the segments matched most strongly to the pBR322
vector, with sequence identity up to 100%. Further,
systematic (one-by-one) analysis of the matched regions
revealed the presence of a partial bla ´ in all samples and
transformants.
The team explained their methodology more fully in the
discussion: ‘The bla ´ gene was developed by recombinant
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cloning applications. Over the years, this antibiotic selective
sequence has been introduced into a series of popular
cloning vectors, including pBR322 pUC18 and pRC19c,
which have become key tools of genetic engineering in the
laboratory and beyond, such as in agriculture’ (p. 13452).
Although the bla ´ gene sequence of the synthetic plasmid
vector (locus 3,2934,153) is identical to that of the wild-
type plasmid, a substantial difference in the sequence
upstream of the bla ´ gene was apparent. Specifically, the
transposase gene present in the wild-type Tn3 was lost
and the pBR322 locus 1,7633,146 was obtained from
another plasmid, pMB1. These distinctive sequence features
make it possible to distinguish the synthetic plasmid
vector-sourced bla ´ from the wild-type plasmid-sourced
bla ´ using sequence-based methods, such as PCR with
primers designed to span the loci of 1,7733,146 and
3,2934,153. Furthermore, the pBR322 locus 2,347
4,353 was found to be sharedwith pUC19. Hence, in their
study, synthetic plasmid vector-specific PCR and qPCR
primers targeting the regions of 3,0863,448 and 3,243
3,305 were used to survey the existence and distribution
of vector-sourced ampicillin-resistant gene contamina-
tion in environmental microbes. And to their surprise, the
bla ´ gene from the synthetic plasmid vector was detected
in samples taken from all six rivers.
Environmental samples are drawn from a complex and
dynamic bacterial community and a large portion of the
species cannot be cultured. Even in those that can be
cultured, not all plasmids can be captured. Metagenomic
technology, which involves transforming environmental
genomic DNA into a lab strain, is a unique way of study-
ing complex genetic samples from ecosystems without
purifying the strains. It has recently been proven useful
in analyzing a diversity of environmental samples. This
method has been adapted for their study. Plasmids were
extracted directly from environmental microbes for trans-
formation of lab E. coli, and a plasmid metagenomic
library of 205 ampicillin resistance strains constructed, of
which 27.3% were positive for bla ´.
They concluded: ‘the potential hazards of environ-
mental release of synthetic plasmid vectors and GM pro-
ducts containing the vector components should be given
more attention’ (p. 13454).
The WHO has released its 2014 report on antimicro-
bial resistance, sounding appropriate alarm that the last
resort antimicrobial has been breached, and exhorting
the world’s nations rightly to avoid overuse and abuse of
antibiotics (14). However, it has omitted mentioning
GMOs and the GM technologies altogether, which as
the Chinese study has demonstrated is a major source of
antibiotic resistance affecting humans and livestock. The
importance of genetic modification in spreading anti-
biotic resistance was predicted in our paper published in
1998 (1).
Molecular geneticists in Europe, the United States, and
elsewhere should now probe for the presence of GM
nucleic acids including antibiotic resistance marker genes
in the environment while halting the further releases of
GM nucleic acids, both deliberate and ‘tolerated’ from
‘contained use’.
In summary, horizontal transfer of transgenes is the
elephant in room, and regulatory agencies such as EFSA
should no longer turn a blind eye to this potential
menace.
References
1. Ho MW, Traavik T, Olsvik O, Tappeser B, Howard V, von
Weizsacker C, et al. Gene technology and gene ecology of
infectious diseases. Microb Ecol Health Dis 1998; 10: 339.
2. Ho MW, Sirinathsinghji E. Ban GMOs now. London: ISIS;
2013.
3. Nielsen KM, Bøhn T, Townsend JP. Detecting rare gene
transfer events in bacterial populations. Front Microbiol 2014;
4: 415, 12 pp.
4. Chen J, Jin M, Ziu Z-G, Guo C, Chen Z-L, Shen Z-Q, et al.
A survey of drug resistance bla ´ genes originating from syn-
thetic plasmid vectors in six Chinese Rivers. Environ Sci
Technol 2012; 45: 344854.
5. Overballe-Petersen S, Harms K, Oriando LA, Mayar JV,
Rasmussen S, Dahl TW, et al. Bacterial natural transformation
by highly fragmented and damaged DNA. Proc Natl Acad Sci
USA 2013; 110: 198605.
6. Mattick JS. The central role of RNA in human development
and cognition. FEBS Lett 2011; 585: 160016.
7. Ho MW, Ryan A, Cummins J, Traavik T. Slipping through
the regulatory net, ‘naked’ and ‘free’ nucleic acids. Penang:
TWN; 2001. Available from: http://www.i-sis.org.uk/onlinestore/
books.php
8. Shapiro JA. How life changes itself: the read-write (RW)
genome. Phys Life Rev 2013; 10: 287323.
9. Ho MW. The new genetics and natural versus artiﬁcial genetic
modiﬁcation. Entropy 2013; 15: 474881.
10. Ho MW. Evolution by natural genetic engineering. Sci Soc
2014; 63: 1823.
11. Eberwine J, Sui J-Y, Bartfai T, Kim J. The promise of single-
cell sequencing. Nat Methods 2013; 11: 257.
12. Zhang Y, Shi C, Yu J, Ren J, Sun D. Rpos regulates a novel
type of plasmid DNA transfer in E. coli. PLoS One 2012; 7:
e33514. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone003351.
13. Sirinathsinghji E. GM antibiotic resistance in all China’s rivers.
Sci Soc 2013; 57: 67.
14. Antimicrobial resistance, global report on surveillance. World
Health Organization; 2014. Available from: http://apps.who.
int/iris/bitstream/10665/112642/1/9789241564748_eng.pdf
Mae-Wan Ho
4
(page number not for citation purpose)
Citation: Microbial Ecology in Health & Disease 2014, 25: 25919 - http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/mehd.v25.25919